Report of the Résident of France in Đồng Hới – Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM), file GGI 65962
Đồng Hới, 12 February 1935
The Résident of France in Đồng Hới to the Résident-Supérieur in Annam, Huế
I have the honour to report to you my conclusions regarding the railway accident which occurred on 6 February 1935 at Thuận Ly, Đồng Hới station.
The Huế to Hà Nội direct train was approaching Đồng Hới station at 3.05am when, shortly after passing the points (switch) at the station entrance, the train derailed. Informed of the accident by the station master at 3.20am, I arrived at the scene at 3.45am, accompanied by M. LECOURTIER, assistant administrator, M. VELASQUE, inspector commanding the Engineering Infantry Brigade, M. COURANT, head guard of that Brigade, and Chief Physician CAO XUAN CAM of Đồng Hới Hospital.
Most of the injured, gathered in the station waiting room and offices, were having their wounds provisionally dressed under the direction of two uninjured travellers, Doctors MARC and X. About 15 Annamite nuns of the Order of Saint-Marie, also uninjured travellers, lent their voluntary assistance as nurses. In agreement with Messrs Marc and X, I sent Chief Physician CAM to the hospital to make preparations and immediately began the evacuation of all the wounded to Đồng Hới, using the three automobiles I had at the station.
I then went to the scene of the accident, about 200 metres from the main station building. I ordered a security service, which was organised by Mr Velasque, to take command of a section of riflemen, unwounded soldiers on leave who had been travelling on the train. Members of the Engineering Infantry from Đồng Hới, arriving at that moment, reinforced the security service, and I ordered the D.6 switch and locomotive 1004 to be guarded by military and armed forces.
M. Velasque went to the Locomotive Depot to fetch a complete supply of axes and hammers. Meanwhile, the assistant administrator, accompanied by M. Courant, was searching the rubble to check for any buried victims.
Helped by the statements of a few uninjured passengers, they discovered the body of a European in a compartment of a mixed 1st, 2nd and 3rd class (ABC) carriage and immediately determined that he had passed away. Meanwhile, M. Courant, with the help of two guards, managed to free an Annamite man from a 4th-class compartment.
However, they could only lift the planks and wood weighing on his chest and place him in a sitting position, his leg being completely trapped in a tangle of scrap metal.
At 5am, the body of the European victim was freed and transported on a stretcher to the hospital morgue. It was not until daylight that the Annamite victim, then still alive, could be freed. It was only with the first light of dawn that the shackles imprisoning his leg could be unbolted and untwisted. He was taken to the hospital around 6am.
In the meantime, I was able to visit some slightly bruised survivors who had taken refuge in a nearby house. This small group, composed mainly of women and children, was directed by me to the Residence.
At 6.30am, I telephoned you to report the accident and then returned to the station to collect all the luggage which had been retrieved from the wreckage. I asked M. Velasque, as a judicial police officer, to immediately draw up a non-technical report of information which could be useful to the investigation — the position of the points, the condition of the track, etc etc. After returning to the hospital to check on the most seriously injured, I was able to have all the luggage returned to its owners and then went back to the station to await the relief train, bringing with it Messrs RETHORE and CHANTEBIEN, who had been placed in charge of the technical investigation, and Doctors TERRISSE and LEMOINE.
The assistant administrator and Inspector VELASQUE took charge of the funeral arrangements at the morgue and the honours to be paid to the victim, who had been identified as Lieutenant Jean GALOT of the colonial infantry stationed in Cap Saint-Jacques.
The relief train was able to leave Đồng Hới at 12.50pm, carrying all the survivors and the lightly wounded. The body of Annamite PHAN TAT, who had died around noon, unable to withstand the necessary amputation, was removed in the presence of the entire population, with the Brigade paying its respects the same day at 6pm. The deceased was escorted that night to Huế, where he was handed over to the representative of the General commanding the Annam Brigade.
As an auxiliary of justice, I placed the driver, the fireman and the assistant fireman under arrest and conducted various interrogations, sealed reports, and conducted judicial surveys of the scene.
For your information, I believe it is useful to report on the various conclusions revealed by the administrative, technical, and judicial investigations regarding the causes of the accident:
1. Initial cause of the accident – The definitive cause of the accident was the excessive speed of the train as it passed over the points at the entrance to the station. The speed recording tape, kept under seal by me, indicates at that time a speed of 64 kilometers per hour, while the regulatory speed was 5 kph with a tolerance margin up to 15 kph. This is therefore undeniably the responsibility of the traction unit, engine or driver.
2. Responsibility for the accident – After several interrogations, the driver admitted responsibility for the accident and was able this very morning to explain to me in a plausible manner, consistent with the observations made, the somewhat psychological cause of his failure. After employing an initial defense which could be summarised as: “I performed all my maneuvres correctly, I don’t understand what happened,” he realised that the automatic speed recording would reveal the implausibility of such an account. He then claimed that there had been a brake malfunction. At my urging, and confronted with his contradictions and the gaps in his explanations, he gave me this time an account more acceptable and one which perfectly explains the facts. He did indeed regularly perform all the slowing manoeuvres he was supposed to, but he applied them too late.
He was accustomed to seeing the stop signal indicating the station entrance from a distance of 400 or 500 metres, but this time, for one reason or another, he only saw it from a distance of 30 metres. He still had time to carry out all his manoeuvres – long whistle, close the regulator, put the engine into gear, brake, short whistle – as he approached the points, about 600 metres from the stop signal. Indeed, he carried out all of these manoeuvres correctly, but automatically and mechanically, at the usual pace, without realising that he should have hurried more than usual, since he had begun them 300 metres further on than usual. In other words, he was in full possession of his faculties and acted as normal, without realising that his last manoeuvre – braking – would not take place as usual, 300 metres before the points, but rather very close to the points. This explains the absolutely correct, but delayed, way in which he acted, thinking of everything, doing everything he had to do, taking care not to brake suddenly and only fully applying the brake lever a few dozen metres from the points.
3. Technical cause of the accident – The excessive speed when passing the points caused the locomotive to derail at the start of a cant and curve in the track, to tilt, carrying with it the reinforced concrete and iron poles of the telegraph line and the coal elevator, and finally to overturn, along with its tender, 25 metres from its point of derailment. The carriages crashed into each other, and since this pile-up occurred on the points, they were diverted in all directions.
4. From a legal point of view, the investigation is virtually over. I will send the file to the Attorney General within two weeks, along with my conclusions on the driver’s recognised criminal liability. I intend to release the three defendants on bail in a few days.
For your information, I will send you a copy of the conclusions which I will send to the Attorney General, as well as a copy of the confidential report with comments that I believe should be attached to it in order to study the issue of criminal liability and its possible sanction from a judicial, administrative, and political perspective.
Signed: PIERROT
Tim Doling is the author of The Railways and Tramways of Việt Nam (White Lotus Press, Bangkok, 2012) and also gives talks on Việt Nam railway history to visiting groups.
A full index of all Tim’s blog articles since November 2013 is now available here.